We are immersed in a political struggle that appeals to pluralism not only in the 
snippets). I will not explore the use of IT further. Instead, I will try to explain the geometries of knowledge relevance that express scalar power differences by using the case of the political events that happened in Greece in July 2015.
1 During that critical period the radical left government of Syriza who had been voted into power in January on an anti-austerity program, under pressure by the Eurogroup 2 to accept strict structural adjustment measures, called for a referendum to take place on 5 th July 2 over accepting (YES / NAI) or refusing (NO / OXI) the conditions set for receiving financial support. Results of the referendum gave a resounding victory to those op to austerity (38.6% YES against 61.3% NO, with a turnout of 62.5%). Nevertheles before the end of the month, and after an internal crisis, the government was forced by the European Commission to accept a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) requiring 'rationalization' of public services, VAT increase, pension reform, as well as privatization of public assets, in exchange for obtaining a loan needed to cover vital public expenses and sovereign debt interests. Financial assistance was conditional on the implementation of austerity, and explicitly subsumed the Greek government's political authority to 'technical assistance' based on the knowledge of 'international experts', 'international organizations', 'independent consultants', and 'best practices in the EU' based on 'parametric' measurable truths (European Commission 2015). This Greek moment reveals the tension of different forms of knowledge that are confronted in a political struggle for truth. On the one hand, the experience that people have of everyday harshness under austerity. On the other hand, the parameters and models that experts present as evidence for the need of structural adjustment and which become the argument for policy.
In this contribution I ask what kinds of knowledge does experience produce and how might we engage with it as anthropologists trying to understand what social facts are and the value they have as evidence in political argument and struggle. In order to accomplish this I will address the tensions between experience, knowledge, and evidence in their connection with the production and challenge of particular fields of inequality.
A project and a historical event
The research project Grassroots economics, 4 which I have been coordinating since 2013, tries to discover the tension between 'expert' and 'lay' understandings of economic realities and their effects on livelihood opportunities and on macro-economic processes. It addresses the present-day austerity conjuncture in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece and its consequences for increasingly precarized sectors of the population and for the distribution of resources more generally. A team of ten researchers undertook fieldwork in the four selected countries of Southern Europe in order to observe the livelihood practices and gather discursive arguments on the causes and effects of, and the solutions to the 'crisis'. 5 We asked, what are the meanings and practices held by 'ordinary' people when they go about trying to make a living and to have a life worth living? (Narotzky and Besnier 2014) In their everyday lives, these understandings and the actions attached to them contribute to explaining the world and participate in its transformation. However, they relate in various ways (often through practice) to explanatory discourses, policy memorandums, decisions and implementations provided by 'experts', powerful actors, the media, the government and its agents. What is the truth value of these different understandings that often overlap in incongruous ways? How do they refer to particular experiences? Are they in some way indexes of something else? Do they constitute evidence, and hence refer to something beyond interpretation to be used in an argument about truth, and about how this truth can be mobilized to reproduce or change the world as we know it? Likewise, economic neoliberal 'expert' knowledge, with its insistence on deficit control and the benefits of austerity, is perceived by an increasingly precarized population as obviously wrong (i.e. incongruous with their real life experience), even as it retains enough technical knowledge authority to have the state impose its destructive solutions against all evidence. States appear to be hostage to a dominant school of academic thought (glossed as neoliberal) that privileges some interests over others (e.g. tax breaks
and sweet deals for large firms vs. increased taxation for the self-employed, petty commerce, small enterprises, and consumers) and results in widening the gap of inequality.
At the same time, the struggle over sovereignty and privilege (over control and status) is replayed at the scale of nations in the arena of a European project (sponsored by the European Commission) that has explicitly abandoned the aim of 'convergence' and replaced it by the evidence of 'divergence' and the discourse of a multi-speed integration defining -on technical grounds-a group of 'core' nations capable of a fuller and stronger co-operation. One of the oldest proponents of multi-speed integration in 1994, while the Maastricht Treaty was being negotiated, was Germany's finance minister Wolgang Schaüble (Ghironi 2015 , The Economist 03-25-2017 . This is the same Schaüble who became in 2015 the symbol of his country's public harassment of
Greece's Syriza anti-austerity government. The result was a 'nationalization' of economic conflict that referred people back to memories and testimonies of past experiences (of the Nazi occupation during World War II, of a colonial past) and placed identity (national, cultural) at the center of the production of inequalities.
In Greece, the forcing of the first Syriza government to abandon its own 'expert' knowledge and anti-austerity policies (reflected in the works and deeds of, for example, against. Some regions such as Crete had more than 70% NO, with older people and pensioners more prone to vote YES, which was often explained as their fear of Greece exiting the eurozone and resulting in a loss of value of their life savings. 6 Nevertheless, most of the people we talked to, whatever their vote, agreed that the series of events leading to the signature of the third MoU pointed to a breakdown of the state as representing popular will and sovereignty. Indeed, after earning 36.3% of the votes in the 25 January 2015 elections and forming a radical left government (in coalition with the nationalist ANEL party who had 4.8% votes) 7 Syriza vowed not to pursue austerity and was hailed as the hope for re-embedding the economy, putting people before profit in a "return of the politial" (Karatsioli 2015) . nationalists of the ANEL party, radical leftists of Syriza, revolutionaries of ANTARSYA or even fascists of Golden Dawn, all where supporters of the NO vote) projected into the future as becoming worse through more austerity (in particular, repeal of the law providing safety against repossession of first residence, cuts to pension, total destruction of public healthcare and education, etc.). Their experience and the negative expectations it projected was the truth that should guide policy, rather than the abstract calculations of a well-meaning government following international technical experts and institutional powers. To disregard people's experience as the core evidence of truth arguments pointed to a crass error of judgment by governing powers and their advisers.
The fact that the Syriza government submitted and signed the MoU after the OXI vote was also a reality check for Greek people: what was the knowledge value of people's everyday experience of increased vulnerability and deprivation?
A challenge of method
All these questions pushed us to be cautious and reflexive, but at the same time to hear and value the knowledge of those that were not given credit by those in powerful positions. How was the struggle for knowledge authority being reconfigured after the crisis? And what was being constituted as the basis of the authority and legitimacy of knowledge by different social actors? Indeed, we wished to value a form of knowledge that was marginalized by models of economic processes and behavior (macro and micro, mainstream and heterodox, neo-liberal, neo-keynesian and neo-marxian alike).
We were inspired by Bourdieu's reflexivity framework (Bourdieu 2003) , by
Foucauldian power-knowledge insights (Foucault 1980) , the sociologies of absence and relevance (Santos 2001a (Santos , 2001b or 'knowledges otherwise' (Escobar 2007), but still held strongly to a historical realism position (Narotzky and Smith 2006) . We did not pretend to disallow or supersede the work of scholars or 'expert' knowledges, however, not least because their arguments often became entangled in lay reasoning. Indeed we sought to make them equally relevant to our search for historical and social processes that would connect individual experiences with the production of difference that had material effects in the life opportunities of people. Understanding what kinds of logical connections people make to explain their situation (i.e. how they produce knowledge from their experience) and the practices they consider reasonable to pursue in the present conjuncture, would also provide evidence that would enable a robust critique of hegemonic economic models, policy arguments, and alleged counter-hegemonic proposals. It would provide us with a different modality of knowledge, experientially grounded, constructing social facts that we could critically engage with, eventually leading to stronger arguments, and hopefully better judgment for theory building and for political action. This kind of truth was validated through shared embodied experience and reasonable practice in a particular social context that expressed multiple scales of power and struggle, rather than through statistical data sets and abstract theories of rational (or irrational) individual actors' behavior. The truth we were seeking was not that of an experienced objective reality, nor that of the ordinary people's logics and narratives, but the evidence that emerged from the dialectical confrontation between the practices and knowledges of differently situated people in a coeval world (Fabian 1983) .
Evidence is always of something else; it refers to a reality beyond discourse where individual and collective experience are relationally produced in the struggle for the material and immaterial resources that make social life. Evidence is a will to assert, ground, and legitimate right from wrong: it is presented as proof leading to the correct decision. As such, it is also a struggle for power, often a moral power that might reasonably ground a particular project of society. Evidence, cast in its juridical meaning, refers both to structure (coherence of logical connections) and to materiality (empirical proof).
The three aspects of our anthropological exploration -experience, knowledge, and evidence-pointed us to geometries of relevance, authority, and truth that were set in social fields of power differentials. By addressing them as a methodological challenge, we hoped these dimensions of reality would contribute to the production of social facts, albeit in an environment of factual uncertainty, that of the future consequences of human actions (including categorical definitions, measuring devices, and theoretical models).
This research program seems now particularly relevant, as nationalistic support for exclusionary policies (against immigrants, refugees, and other groups defined as 'undeserving') has grown in the real world of austerity cuts to welfare benefits and social services. Entitlement to livelihood and social protection is redefined in cultural, moral, and identity (national, ethnic, religious) terms rather than social ones, producing confrontation and hierarchy among claimants to resources ( Historians (Portelli 1988 , Guinzburg 1997 [1991 ], Scott 1996 have alerted us to the complex relationship that testimonies have with reality and to their uncritical use as unique evidence. This volatile position of personal experience as a testimony of reality is often strongly felt by participants in historical events who try to support their account with other more 'objective' information (Narotzky 2007) . Experience, indeed, is not an autonomous unmediated fact expressing an immanent reality. Rather it is relationally constituted in a social field of forces and embodies power differentials that it helps reproduce (Bourdieu 1982) .
Conclusion: what happens to social facts
By trying to deal in an un-hierarchical manner with knowledges produced in a strongly differentiated power field are we not distorting the evidence of unequal processes? Are we not unnecessarily proliferating social facts? In so doing, do we not misrepresent or mask the actual processes that cause the lack of knowledge authority of relatively powerless people? From a political economy perspective, facts of power aimed at systemic social reproduction explain the lack of social relevance of some life experiences and conceptual logics about livelihood, wealth accumulation, and domination processes. These powerless voices, then, often get 'translated' (by unions, left wing intellectuals, progressive associations, and NGOs) into some authoritative 'expert' model (possibly a counter-hegemonic project) and co-opted as raw (natural) facts within its realm of authority. Alternatively, they are crushed under the intellectual arrogance of the conceptual models of those in power.
Moreover, the fact that the Grassroots Economics project seeks to acknowledge the equal relevance of lay and expert knowledge, may force lay models into abstraction, the hierarchical apex of knowledge authority: Structures of feeling need to become structures of reason (Williams 1977 , Narotzky 2014 . Is it possible to escape this dilemma by using different knowledges as a method of reciprocally unsettling 'evidence' through bringing embodied 'experience' back into the factual relevance of social facts while retaining the factual relevance of wider social processes that can be empirically assessed often quantitatively? As anthropologists, we are aware that evidence is constructed by using particular devices, defining significant categories, and by the constraint of institutions and powerful actors. However, we still seek to understand how this happens: what kinds of relationships exist between individual lives, collective beliefs, material forces, and the construction of hegemonic evidentiary frameworks.
